In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. ___ (2024), the US Supreme Court overruled the long-standing rule named after Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), under which US courts would (if certain conditions were met), when construing a statute administered by a government agency, “defer” to that agency’s interpretation, provided it was a “permissible” interpretation.

The majority opinion referred to Marshall CJ’s famous declaration in Marbury v Madison 1 Cranch 137 (1803) that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”. Interestingly, the Australian High Court referred to Marbury when it rejected Chevron deference as forming any part of Australian administrative law 24 years ago, in Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135.

However, while Chevron deference has always struck most Australian public lawyers as odd, it has formed a bedrock rule of US administrative law for 40 years, and some have viewed the US Supreme Court’s decision to overrule it as shifting the balance of power towards undermining executive agencies’ abilities to pursue executive policy. For example, a White House press statement said “this decision undermines the ability of federal agencies to use their expertise as Congress intended to make government work for the people”.